PES and Environmental and territorial
Governance: Lessons from empirical studies
France, Costa Rica, Madagascar
Ph. Bonnal, C. Maury, JF. Le Coq, M. Bonin et T.
Legrand



### Why comparing several case studies?

- Consider the governance challenges associated with implementing PES
- How PES contribute (or not) to the transformation of political, economic and social regulation?
- How PES /AEMs influence environmental and territorial governance?



### 3 steps

- Theoretical and methodological questions and short presentation of cases studies
- Comparative analysis of PES design in these different countries
- ❖Analysis of the types of governance induced by these new systems, effects of PES implementation

I. Methodological benchmarks of the analysis and case studies

- ❖ PES/AEM: instruments working for public action in the environmental (Pes) and agri-environmental (AEM) fields subjects to territorial governance whose logic is based on the environmental effect being sought on a territorial or global level
- Instruments: not only geared towards solving problems: create concrete interaction frameworks for constructing issues
- Governance: concretly identifying the adjustements operated in coordination modes between types of stakeholders (hybridization processs between distinct action logics.

## Case studies: instruments in each context

- France: territorial agri environnemental measures in Auvergne (TAEMs)
- France : AEMs in the island of Guadeloupe
- Costa Rica: payment for environmental services programm (PESP)
- Madagascar: Water, Biodiversity and carbon PES






# II. Identify the nature of the regulations linked to instrument management

### **Several criterias**

- Activities to promote the instrument
- Origin and mechanisms of funding
- Conditions of access ot recruitment of service producers
- Monitoring activities



Characterization of ways in which governance modes become hybridized and identification of standard profiles

### 3 types of governance system

National or contractual arrangements run by the State	Contractual arrangements based on local projects linked to global environmental changes	Contractual arrangements based on local projects (focus on conflicts in the use of resources)
France	Madagascar Carbon and Biodiversity PES	Madagascar water PES
Costa Rica	Run by international NGOs via a system of delegation to national NGOs	3 levels

### The State: an essential player

- ❖ AEMs in France: State controls the production of norms and organizes the interface with socioprofesional stakeholders and environemental stakeholders (on different scales from European Union to territory)
- Costa Rica: State also main player but confined to the functions of defining norms and running the system
- Madagascar: State involvment limited both by a lack of resource and political instability: Role of NGOs

### **NGOs**

- European context : Action remain marginal comparing to those of State : Focus on lobbying and persuasion operations
- Madagascar: Essential Role of NGOs partially replace the State (ex drawing up standards for using resources and for managing systems

### Negociation in the regulatory set-ups

France: negociation at different levels and in different domains

Costa Rica: Within Fonafifo (but limited to the representation rules)

Madagascar: Between NGOs and donors (private sector) and NGOs and State services. Real asymmetries in play

# III. Implementation of PES/AEM and their impacts

# Effects concerning interrelations between stakeholders and their participation in the decision process

- ❖ France: Motivations for farmers to sign up AEM contracts remained similar but in the case of TAEM introduction of posible territorialized negociation change the nature of interelation between players
- Costa Rica: PESP (1997) led to greater participation of private players+ change in profile of the beneficiaries (smallholders and Amerindian communities)

# Effects concerning interrelations between stakeholders and their participation in the decision process

- Madagascar: 1st experience of PES, distinction between national or local level
- National level PES (carbon) clearly reconfigure alliances between national stakeholders
- Local level much less visible (for the moment)

## How stakeholders perceptions are influenced by PES?

- France contrast between TAEM in Natura 2000 priority conservation zones and AEM in Guadeloupe where AEM used to restore the image of the sector of banana after the « chlordecone crisis »
- Costa Rica Implementation of the PESP as an adequate means of projecting the country green's image
- Madagascar: Absence of knowledge about the idea ecosystems provide services. PES as innovation from abroad

## Effects of spatial structuring between protected and non-protected zones

PES may or may not induce environmental discontinuity phenomena

❖ Case of discontinuity: Auvergne TAEM (Natura 2000 and water stakes zones), Costa Rica segregation between « protected » territories and productive areas since introduction of protected areas in the 1970s, Madagascar discontinuity due to a plolitical will to step up protected areas but at local level greatly restricted

## Effects of spatial structuring between protected and non-protected zones

Case of continuity: Guadeloupe: entire territoty of the island eligible to AEM

### To conclude

- Comparative approach helps to understand the processes associated to PES/AEM
- Even if empirical studies illustrate existence of irreductible specificities
- All cases: existence of a process of system adaptation, gratly determined bi interactions and interdependencies pre-existed the elaboration of the instrument
- Nevertheless introduction of PES affects the environmental and territorial governance stakes

#### To conclude

- Changes in stakeholders perceptions
- Middlemen apparition who « create a link » between players with diverging interests
- Segregation effects induced by PES lead to the inclusion/exclusion of territories and players