PES and Environmental and territorial Governance: Lessons from empirical studies
France, Costa Rica, Madagascar
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Why comparing several case studies?

- Consider the governance challenges associated with implementing PES
- How PES contribute (or not) to the transformation of political, economic and social regulation?
- How PES /AEMs influence environmental and territorial governance?
3 steps

- Theoretical and methodological questions and short presentation of cases studies
- Comparative analysis of PES design in these different countries
- Analysis of the types of governance induced by these new systems, effects of PES implementation
I. Methodological benchmarks of the analysis and case studies
PES/AEM : instruments working for public action in the environmental (Pes) and agri-environmental (AEM) fields subjects to territorial governance whose logic is based on the environmental effect being sought on a territorial or global level

Instruments : not only geared towards solving problems : create concrete interaction frameworks for constructing issues

Governance : concretly identifying the adjustements operated in coordination modes between types of stakeholders (hybridization processes between distinct action logics.
Case studies: instruments in each context

- France: territorial agri environnemental measures in Auvergne (TAEMs)
- France: AEMs in the island of Guadeloupe
- Costa Rica: payment for environmental services programm (PESP)
- Madagascar: Water, Biodiversity and carbon PES
II. Identify the nature of the regulations linked to instrument management
Several criterias

- Activities to promote the instrument
- Origin and mechanisms of funding
- Conditions of access or recruitment of service producers
- Monitoring activities

Characterization of ways in which governance modes become hybridized and identification of standard profiles
# 3 types of governance system

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>National or contractual arrangements run by the State</th>
<th>Contractual arrangements based on local projects linked to global environmental changes</th>
<th>Contractual arrangements based on local projects (focus on conflicts in the use of resources)</th>
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</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>France</td>
<td>Madagascar Carbon and Biodiversity PES</td>
<td>Madagascar water PES</td>
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<tr>
<td>Costa Rica</td>
<td>Run by international NGOs via a system of delegation to national NGOs</td>
<td>3 levels</td>
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The State : an essential player

- AEMs in France : State controls the production of norms and organizes the interface with socio-professional stakeholders and environmental stakeholders (on different scales from European Union to territory)
- Costa Rica : State also main player but confined to the functions of defining norms and running the system
- Madagascar : State involvement limited both by a lack of resource and political instability : Role of NGOs
NGOs

- European context: Action remain marginal comparing to those of State: Focus on lobbying and persuasion operations.
- Madagascar: Essential Role of NGOs partially replace the State (ex drawing up standards for using resources and for managing systems.)
Negociation in the regulatory set-ups

- France: negotiation at different levels and in different domains
- Costa Rica: Within Fonafifo (but limited to the representation rules)
- Madagascar: Between NGOs and donors (private sector) and NGOs and State services. Real asymmetries in play
III. Implementation of PES/AEM and their impacts
Effects concerning interrelations between stakeholders and their participation in the decision process

- France: Motivations for farmers to sign up AEM contracts remained similar but in the case of TAEM introduction of possible territorialized negotiation change the nature of interrelation between players.

- Costa Rica: PESP (1997) led to greater participation of private players+ change in profile of the beneficiaries (smallholders and Amerindian communities).
Effects concerning interrelations between stakeholders and their participation in the decision process

- Madagascar: 1st experience of PES, distinction between national or local level
- National level PES (carbon) clearly reconfigure alliances between national stakeholders
- Local level much less visible (for the moment)
How stakeholders perceptions are influenced by PES?

- France contrast between TAEM in Natura 2000 priority conservation zones and AEM in Guadeloupe where AEM used to restore the image of the sector of banana after the « chlordecone crisis »
- Costa Rica Implementation of the PESP as an adequate means of projecting the country green’s image
- Madagascar : Absence of knowledge about the idea ecosystems provide services. PES as innovation from abroad
Effects of spatial structuring between protected and non-protected zones

PES may or may not induce environmental discontinuity phenomena

- Case of discontinuity: Auvergne TAEM (Natura 2000 and water stakes zones), Costa Rica segregation between « protected » territories and productive areas since introduction of protected areas in the 1970s, Madagascar discontinuity due to a political will to step up protected areas but at local level greatly restricted
Effects of spatial structuring between protected and non-protected zones

- Case of continuity: Guadeloupe: entire territory of the island eligible to AEM
To conclude

- Comparative approach helps to understand the processes associated to PES/AEM
- Even if empirical studies illustrate existence of irreductible specificities
- All cases: existence of a process of system adaptation, greatly determined by interactions and interdependencies pre-existed the elaboration of the instrument
- Nevertheless introduction of PES affects the environmental and territorial governance stakes
To conclude

- Changes in stakeholders perceptions
- Middlemen apparition who « create a link » between players with diverging interests
- Segregation effects induced by PES lead to the inclusion/exclusion of territories and players